Assessing physical fitness has emerged as a proxy of the health status of children and adolescents and therefore as relevant from a public health point of view. DAFIS is a project included in Plan Galicia Saudable of the regional government of Galicia. DAFIS consists of an on-line software devoted to record the results of a standard physical fitness protocol carried out as a part of the physical education curriculum. The aims of this study were: to obtain normative values of physical (...) fitness of the Galician school population evaluated in the DAFIS project, and to identify a reduced number of components and tests able to capture a significant amount of the variability in the physical fitness of children and adolescents. From an initial sample of 27784 records, 15287 cases were considered after filtering. Generalized Additive Models for Location, Scale and Shape were used for obtaining percentile curves and tables for each sex. Furthermore, a principal components analysis was performed, selecting the number of components by applying the Kaiser’s rule and selecting a subset of variables considering the correlation between each variable and the components. Percentile curves and normative values are reported for each test and sex. Physical fitness was better in boys than in girls throughout age groups, except for flexibility that was consistently higher in girls. Two main components were detected throughout age groups: the first one representing body composition and partially cardiorespiratory fitness and the second one muscular fitness. For boys and girls, waist to height ratio had the highest correlations with the first component in four out of six age groups. The highest correlation with the second component, was most frequently observed for the handgrip test both in boys and girls. This study provides evidence about the utility of school community actions like DAFIS aimed to track the health-related fitness of children and adolescents. The results suggest that fat mass distribution and muscular performance concentrate a high proportion physical fitness variance. (shrink)

A philosophical analysis of the works and theory of the noted 20th century French philosopher Emmanuel Mounier.

Este texto introduce un dosier dedicado a reflexionar sobre las relaciones entre el compromiso y la transgresión en la España contemporánea y actual, desde un enfoque de género. Con aportaciones provenientes de la Historia, la Literatura, la Comunicación, la Sociología y la Filosofía, pretende problematizar las jerarquías que suelen establecerse sobre ideales y experiencias desarrollados por mujeres y hombres en ámbitos progresistas o contraculturales. Además, muestra que la trasgresión surge en contextos de activismo intelectual, político, social o feminista al subvertir (...) el orden de género y promover avances en la igualdad, pero no está libre de tensiones y paradojas. (shrink)

Recent work at the intersection of moral philosophy and the philosophy of psychology has dealt mostly with Aristotelian virtue ethics. The dearth of scholarship that engages with Hume’s moral philosophy, however, is both noticeable and peculiar. Hume's Moral Philosophy and Contemporary Psychology demonstrates how Hume’s moral philosophy comports with recent work from the empirical sciences and moral psychology. It shows how contemporary work in virtue ethics has much stronger similarities to the metaphysically thin conception of human nature that Hume developed, (...) rather than the metaphysically thick conception of human nature that Aristotle espoused. It also reveals how contemporary work in moral motivation and moral epistemology has strong affinities with themes in Hume’s sympathetic sentimentalism. (shrink)

Das primäre Ziel dieses Open-Access-Buches besteht in der Entwicklung einer Theorie pluraler epistemischer Autoritäten. Epistemische Autoritäten spielen in unserer durch Spezialisierung geprägten und hochgradig arbeitsteilig organisierten modernen "Informations-" oder "Wissensgesellschaft" eine zentrale Rolle. Die Philosophie hat diesem Umstand in den letzten Jahren durch eine zunehmend intensive Diskussion Rechnung getragen. Ein entscheidendes Defizit dieser Debatte besteht nach Diagnose des Autors allerdings darin, dass sie sich fast ausschließlich auf individuelle epistemische Autoritäten konzentriert hat. In unserer epistemischen Praxis sind plurale epistemische Autoritäten - (...) d.h. wissenschaftliche Gemeinschaften, Expertengremien, Geschworenenjurys usw. - aber mindestens genauso bedeutsam. Wir berufen uns auf "wissenschaftlichen Konsens", orientieren uns an "herrschenden Meinungen" usw. und stützen uns damit auf plurale epistemische Autoritäten. Das Buch möchte die Potentiale, aber auch die Herausforderungen und Fallstricke analysieren, die diese Praxis des Sich-Stützens auf plurale epistemische Autoritäten mit sich bringt. Der Autor Rico Hauswald ist Privatdozent am Institut für Philosophie der TU Dresden und Teilprojektleiter im BMBF-geförderten interdisziplinären Forschungsvorhaben "Verantwortungsvoller Umgang mit künstlicher Intelligenz in der Medizin". Arbeitsschwerpunkte liegen u. a. in der Wissenschafts-, Erkenntnis- und Medizintheorie. (shrink)

According to John Searle, money is an institutional entity; it is among the things “that exist only because we believe them to exist”. I believe that Searle’s view is correct in some important respects. At the same time, I argue that money is a real or natural kind, much in the same way as biological species or chemical substances are real kinds about which empirical knowledge can be accumulated. The paper attempts to show the consistency of these assumptions. My argument (...) proceeds in two steps. First, I introduce homeostatic property cluster theory and characterize it as the most adequate account of real kinds that has been developed so far. Second, I reexamine, and to some extent reinterpret, money – one of Searle’s central examples of an institutional kind – and argue that it meets the conditions of a real kind as stated by HPC theory. An important part of the argument is a reconsideration of the circularity problem, i.e., the problem that Searle’s way of analyzing money already seems to presuppose the concept of money. (shrink)

The contents of two Egerton manuscripts are analyzed in this paper. One, dating from 1598, is part of the correspondence between Mariana and García de Loaysa. In it, Mariana recommends someone for his friend’s government, refers to some issues of ecclesiastical policy, to his future publications and also expresses his gratitude for a personal favour. The second manuscript, dating from 1599, contains an epitaph written by Mariana after the death of García de Loaysa, which includes biographical details and feelings of (...) a family and personal nature. It amounts to a portrait which is strikingly different from other far more negative ones that history has bequeathed us. (shrink)

Drawing on the relevant alternatives framework and Mary Kate McGowan’s work on conversational scorekeeping, I argue that usage of the term ‘conspiracy theory’ in ordinary language and public discourse typically entails the performance of what I call a dismissive conversational exercitive, a kind of speech act that functions to exclude certain propositions from (or prevent their inclusion in) the set of alternatives considered relevant in a given conversational context. While it can be legitimate to perform dismissive conversational exercitives, excluding alternatives (...) that deserve to be taken seriously can be highly problematic for a variety of reasons. For one, it can give rise to what I call the problem of premature conclusions when subjects illegitimately dismiss certain propositions as irrelevant and, as a result, prematurely take certain conclusions or claims to be warranted. Depending on the kind of conclusion or claim, the problem can come in different variants, three of which I shall examine in more detail: the problem of premature knowledge claims, the problem of premature causal claims, and the problem of premature generic generalizations. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to explain Hume’s account of the way both the scope and the degree of benevolent motivation is limited. I argue (i) that Hume consistently affirms, both in the Treatise and in the second Enquiry, that the scope of benevolent motivation is very broad, such that it includes any creature that is conscious and capable of thought, and (ii) that the degree of benevolent motivation is limited, such that a person is naturally inclined to feel (...) benevolence more strongly for one with whom he or she has a ‘connexion’—e.g., a family member or friend. (shrink)

Heterodox ideas face an uphill battle. This is not least the case for heterodox conspiracy theories. As an empirical observation, this is hardly controversial. What is controversial is whether and to what extent this should be the case. Some authors have gone so far as to argue that heterodox conspiracy theories should be generally dismissed, and that it is precisely their heterodox status that justifies such dismissal. Most particularists are likely to object strongly to such an assessment, arguing that conspiracy (...) theories – whether heterodox or orthodox – should not be dismissed before careful examination of the relevant evidence. But even particularists will probably concede that proponents of heterodox conspiracy theories have to bear a special epistemic burden. The main aim of this paper is to take a closer look at this particular epistemic burden. Drawing on the literature about peer disagreement, genealogical debunking arguments, and related philosophical debates, I focus in particular on the question of whether and under what conditions it can be rational to defend heterodox conspiracy theories, and argue that what I will call theories of error play a crucial role in this context. (shrink)

This article explores Heidegger's later philosophy with regard to the problem of a philosophical interpretation of religious language. In what follows, I will draw upon the work of Wittgenstein and refer to the cosmological argument to read Heidegger in terms of a post-theistic understanding of religious language that avoids the shortcomings of both theistic realism and non-cognitivism. At the same time, I am proposing a new interpretation of Heidegger's later philosophy against this background. I will show that, in spite of (...) its hermeticism, Heidegger's later philosophy has a specific relevance to philosophy of religion that still needs to be explored. (shrink)

RESUMEN: Este trabajo centra la atención en las características formales de la ley humana en el pensamiento de Juan de Mariana. En él se ofrece una presentación general de aquellas, acompañada de algunas circunstancias de la época. A continuación se trata de determinar la intención del autor en sus desarrollos y se analizan sus aportaciones, tanto desde la perspectiva del pensamiento ilustrado como desde el iusfilosófico de nuestro tiempo. Todo ello evidencia puntos de encuentro, pero también diferencias relevantes. El estudio (...) repara además en la aportación de los aspectos considerados en los ámbitos de la limitación al poder y la justicia. ABSTRACT: This article considers the formal characteristics of human law in the thought of Juan de Mariana. After a general introduction to those characteristics, accompanied by some contextual background, an attempt is made to ascertain the author’s intentions as his thought developed and to analyse his particular contribution to the matter through the double optic of enlightenment thought on the one hand, and contemporary jusphilosophy on the other. Some points of connection are found, but also various significant differences. At the same time, the article also gives some thought to the contribution made by the various aspects under consideration in the fields of justice and of the restriction of power. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine one particular element of Hume’s psychology of religious belief. More specifically, I attempt to elucidate his account of what I call the sustaining causes of religious belief—that is, those causes that keep religious beliefs alive in modern human societies. In attempting to make some progress at clarifying this element of Hume’s psychology, I examine one particular ‘experiment’—namely, the case of Thomas More, a man who is, by Hume’s own admission, a person of remarkable virtue. I (...) contend that the most salient Humean explanations of More’s religious convictions are implausible but that Hume has at his disposal three more plausible hypotheses to account for More’s faith. I conclude, however, by suggesting that these hypotheses alone are insufficient to solve the puzzle More poses for this particular element of Hume’s psychology of religious belief. (shrink)

“God beyond Being”: the vertigo of Marion’s famous phrase entails serious questions. Aiming at piety and respect as to God’s alterity, it seems to end in a hazardous neglect of incarnation. Is it ‘Jewish’ thinking that has to remind a ‘Christian’ thinker of incarnational necessity? First, attention is drawn towards Marion’s critique of Heidegger and his rejection of the Heideggerian condition imposed upon divine Revelation: the condition of having to give in to ontological difference. Next, Marion’s critique of Derrida is (...) subjected to a more detailed study. The author attempts to make clear that, according to Marion, Derrida, while pretending to go behind Heideggerian ontological difference, falls back behind it. The Derridean concept of différance, says Marion, might be seen as just a contemporary figure of an underlying, more fundamental, ontological difference. Finally, a Derridean stance is adopted in a formulation of some serious questions as to Marion’s theo-phenomenological project itself. In particular, it is asked whether Marion’s project avoids what will be termed an ‘incarnational’ necessity, imposed by philosophical rigour and also inscribed within the Christian tradition. (shrink)

El presente trabajo reconstruye algunas de las tesis centrales de la familia realista-liberal de la democracia en relación con los liderazgos políticos y la participación política de la ciudadanía en sus dos fases de pensamiento: desde el elitismo hacia la poliarquía. Posteriormente se formulan algunas de las críticas que los teóricos deliberativos le realizan a este modelo en relación con el carácter minimalista de la participación y sus dificultades para combatir posibles poderes exógenos a la política. En este sentido, se (...) presentan tres pilares del modelo deliberativo para superar esta aparente debilidad del modelo realista-liberal y generar autonomía política o, al menos, combatir su heteronomía a través de: 1) la transformación de preferencias, 2) el ejercicio de una razón comunicativa, y 3) una fundamentación epistémica de las creencias morales. (shrink)

Descartes’s concern with the proper method of belief formation is evident in the titles of his works—e.g., The Search after Truth, The Rules for the Direction of the Mind, and The Discourse on Method of rightly conducting one’s reason and seeking the truth in the sciences. It is most apparent, however, in his famous discussions, both in the Meditations and in the Principles, of one particularly noteworthy source of our doxastic errors—namely, the misuse of one’s will. What is not widely (...) recognized, let alone appreciated and understood, is the relationship between his concern with belief formation and his concern with virtue. In fact, few seem to realize that Descartes regards doxastic errors as moral errors and as sins both because such errors are intrinsically vicious and because they entail notably deleterious social consequences. Reforming the Art of Living seeks to rectify this rather common oversight in two ways. First, it aims to elucidate the nature of Descartes’s account of virtuous belief formation. Second, it aims both (i) to illuminate the social significance of Descartes’s philosophical program as it relates to the understanding and practice not of science, but of religion and (ii) to develop a kind of Leibnizian critique of this aspect of his program. More specifically, it aims to show that Descartes’s project is “dangerous,” insofar as it is subversive not only of traditional Christianity but also of other traditional forms of religion, both in theory and in practice. (shrink)

Pyrrhonian skepticism is usually understood as a form of quietism, since it is supposed to bring us back to where we were in our everyday lives before we got disturbed by philosophical questions. Similarly, the ‘therapeutic’ and ‘resolute’ readings of Wittgenstein claim that Wittgenstein’s ‘philosophical practice’ results in the dissolution of the corresponding philosophical problems and brings us back to our everyday life. Accordingly, Wittgenstein is often linked to Pyrrhonism and classified as a quietist. Against this reading, I will employ (...) Laurie Paul’s notion of epistemically transformative experience and argue that Pyrrhonian skepticism and Wittgenstein’s philosophy can be interpreted as a philosophical practice that changes our self-understanding in significant ways. I will argue that this practice can evoke transformative experiences and is thereby able to yield a non-propositional insight into the finitude of the human condition. This shows that Pyrrhonian skepticism and Wittgenstein’s philosophy go beyond quietism. (shrink)

This article aims to reflect on the challenges of peace education in times of Covid-19 global pandemic from a positive perspective, understood as a new opportunity for education to consider the teaching of how to make peace from our daily experiences; and in this way, humanity can forge a more peaceful future. In this task, the use of imagination, fantasy and creativity as educational resources will be revalued. Likewise, utopia is proposed as that unknown horizon, still to come, that will (...) show us, in the face of so many doubts and uncertainties, those possible scenarios which will motivate us to continue working for cultures of peace. This reflection starts from the Reconstructive-Empowering Peace Education approach that I have been proposing in my research as a member of the Interuniversity Institute of Social Development and Peace. (shrink)

Cantor argued that absolute infinity is beyond mathematical comprehension. His arguments imply that the domain of mathematics cannot be grasped by mathematical means. We argue that this inability constitutes a foundational problem. For Cantor, however, the domain of mathematics does not belong to mathematics, but to theology. We thus discuss the theological significance of Cantor’s treatment of absolute infinity and show that it can be interpreted in terms of negative theology. Proceeding from this interpretation, we refer to the recent debate (...) on absolute generality and argue that the method of diagonalization constitutes a modern version of the vianegativa. On our reading, negative theology can evoke an attitude of humility with respect to the boundedness of the human condition. Along these lines, we think that the foundational problem of mathematics concerning its domain can be addressed through a methodological attitude of humility. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Christ’s second love command implies not only that people’s volitions and actions be Christ-like, but also that their affective-motivational dispositions be Christ-like. More specifically, I argue that the command implies that people have aretaic obligations to strive to cultivate a merciful heart with the kind of affective depth described by St. Isaac of Syria in his 71st ascetical homily—i.e., one that is disposed to becoming inflamed, such that it is gripped by “strong and vehement (...) mercy.”. (shrink)

Doxastic voluntarism is the philosophical doctrine according to which people have voluntary control over their beliefs. Philosophers in the debate about doxastic voluntarism distinguish between two kinds of voluntary control. The first is known as direct voluntary control and refers to acts which are such that if a person chooses to perform them, they happen immediately. For instance, a person has direct voluntary control over whether he or she is thinking about his or her favorite song at a given moment. (...) The second is known as indirect voluntary control and refers to acts which are such that although a person lacks direct voluntary control over them, he or she can cause them to happen if he or she chooses to perform some number of other, intermediate actions. For instance, a person untrained in music has indirect voluntary control over whether he or she will play a melody on a violin. Corresponding to this distinction between two kinds of voluntary control, philosophers distinguish between two kinds of doxastic voluntarism. Direct doxastic voluntarism claims that people have direct voluntary control over at least some of their beliefs. Indirect doxastic voluntarism, however, supposes that people have indirect voluntary control over at least some of their beliefs, for example, by doing research and evaluating evidence. This article offers an introductory explanation of the nature of belief, the nature of voluntary control, the reasons for the consensus regarding indirect doxastic voluntarism, the reasons for the disagreements regarding direct doxastic voluntarism, and the practical implications for the debate about doxastic voluntarism in ethics, epistemology, political theory, and the philosophy of religion. (shrink)

Thomas Sebeok es reconocido por ser el principal fundador de la biosemiótica, doctrina interdisciplinaria en la que la semiótica y la biología se cruzan para comprender a los vivientes como seres de semiosis, es decir, capaces de producir e interpretar signos. De acuerdo con sus afirmaciones, su proyecto teórico se sostiene principalmente sobre dos pilares: la semiótica de Charles Sanders Pierce y la biología de Jakob von Uexküll. No obstante, esto no excluye otras influencias, como la de uno de los (...) hijos de Uexküll, Thure. En esto texto se explora esta línea de influencia teórica en la obra sebeokena, esto es, la de los dos Uexküll. Por un lado, la doctrina del mundo circundante (Umweltlehre) de Jakob le permite a Sebeok comenzar a comprender procesos semiósicos no verbales más allá de lo humano, en plantas y animales. Por otro lado, la propuesta endosemiótica de Thure, que ve en la célula la unidad mínima de semiosis, le ayuda a Sebeok a extender el campo de estudio de la biosemiótica a todo lo vivo. Con ello, Sebeok logra comprender finalmente los mundos circundantes de los seres vivos como modelos semiósicos de lo real, esto es, como modelos fenoménicos y significativos constituidos subjetivamente por medio de signos. Esto implica la asunción de tesis idealistas, heredadas del trascendentalismo kantiano, que implican algunas consecuencias filosóficas que se analizan hacia el final del trabajo. (shrink)

While AI systems are increasingly assuming roles traditionally occupied by human epistemic authorities (EAs), their epistemological status remains unclear. This paper aims to address this lacuna by assessing the potential for AI systems to be recognized as artificial epistemic authorities. In a first step, I examine the arguments against considering AI systems as EAs, in particular the established model of EAs as engaging in intentional belief transfer via testimony to laypeople – a process seemingly inapplicable to intentionless and beliefless AI. (...) Despite this, AI systems exhibit striking epistemic parallels with human EAs, including epistemic asymmetry and opacity that give rise to comparable challenges for both laypeople and AI users. These challenges include the identification problem – how to recognize reliable EAs/AI systems – and the deference problem – determining the appropriate epistemic stance towards EAs/AI systems. Faced with this dilemma, I discuss three possible solutions: 1. reject the concept of artificial EAs, 2. accept that AI can possess beliefs and intentions and thus align with the standard model, or 3. develop an alternative model that encompasses artificial EAs. I argue that while each option has its benefits and costs, a particularly strong case can be made for option 3. (shrink)

My aim in this chapter is twofold. I attempt to provide an example of how (1) careful analysis in the history of philosophy can (2) elucidate contemporary debates about philosophical issues. My analysis of Hume’s account of the contagion of belief unfolds in three parts. In section one, I offer a summary of Hume’s account of the nature of beliefs concerning matters of fact. In section two, I elucidate his account of the “contagion of opinion” itself, explaining how beliefs are (...) contagious, why the contagious nature of beliefs is so powerful, and how people can resist the contagion. In section three, I elucidate the significance of Hume’s account of contagious beliefs for his account of doxastic virtues and explain the conditions under which it is virtuous to resist contagious beliefs. (shrink)

In this paper, I clarify Descartes’s account of belief, in general, and of judgment, in particular. Then, drawing upon this clarification, I explain the type of direct doxastic voluntarism that he endorses. In particular, I attempt to demonstrate two claims. First, I argue that there is strong textual evidence that, on Descartes’s account, people have the ability to suspend, or to withhold, judgment directly by an act will. Second, I argue that there is weak and inconclusive textual evidence that, on (...) his account, people have the ability to form a judgment directly by an act will. I conclude by suggestion that understanding the position Descartes actually endorses (which I call ‘negative direct doxastic voluntarism’) has implications, more broadly, for contemporary participants in the doxastic voluntarism debate. (shrink)

The distinction between institution types and institution tokens plays an important role in Francesco Guala’s philosophy of institutions. In this commentary, I argue that this distinction faces a number of difficulties that are not sufficiently addressed in Understanding Institutions. In particular, I critically discuss Guala’s comparison between the taxonomy of organisms and the taxonomy of institutions, consider the semantics of institution terms on different levels in this taxonomy, and argue for an alternative solution to the problem of how to reconcile (...) reformism and realism about institutions like marriage. (shrink)

Scepticism and negative theology are best understood not as theoretical positions, but rather as forms of philosophical practice that performatively undermine our knowledge claims or our seeming understanding of God. In particular, I am arguing that both scepticism and negative theology invoke the failure of the attempt to understand the absolute, be it God or the notion of absolute objectivity. However, with reference to L. A. Paul’s notion of epistemically transformative experience, I am arguing that we still understand something about (...) the absolute through the experience of failing to think it. This, of course, is a non-propositional form of understanding, and I am arguing that there is something about the finitude of the human condition that can only be understood through a transformative philosophical experience with respect to the absolute. (shrink)

Since antiquity, philosophy has aimed not only at theoretical insight, but also at personal development and transformation. This implies a new relationship to the self and the world, which can result, for example, from existential experiences triggered by the engagement with philosophical problems. Drawing on the examples of facticity and scepticism, this paper develops the thesis that transformative philosophical experience and a corresponding new view of the world can be accompanied by a new understanding of the philosophical problem that triggered (...) the experience. This would involve a non-propositional form of knowledge that is more than practical or phenomenal knowledge. A precise model of such a form of non-propositional insight could shed new light on the transformative dimension of philosophy and, with respect to, e. g., facticity and scepticism, provide a better understanding of limits of knowledge. (shrink)

Philosophical skepticism, according to numerous influential accounts of it, is bound up with our failure or inability to adopt an “absolute” standpoint. Similarly, many religions speak of an “absolute” that also is beyond human reach. With this similarity in mind, I will develop what I take to be a religious dimension of skepticism. First, I will discuss the connection that Stanley Cavell draws between his reading of skepticism and the notions of God and original sin. I will then refer to (...) William James’s description of the religious experience of conversion and apply it to the transformative aspect of skepticism. Finally, I will argue with respect to mysticism and negative theology that the transformative experiences one can find in both skepticism and religion can be interpreted as yielding an experiential understanding of the finitude of the human condition. (shrink)

What is the correct epistemic stance that laypeople should take vis-a-vis epistemic authorities? The author provides an answer to this question based on a critical examination of Linda Zagzebski’s Preemption Thesis, according to which the fact that an authority has a belief p is a reason for a layperson to believe p that replaces her other reasons relevant to believing p and is not simply added to them. In contrast, the author argues that epistemic deference requires a layperson to perform (...) a number of epistemic tasks and involves an active and critical stance that conflicts with the Preemption Thesis. (shrink)